AuthorsA. Melloni, M. Stam and Ø. Ytrehus
EditorsR. AlTawy and A. Hülsing
TitleOn Evaluating Anonymity of Onion Routing
Project(s)Cryptography Section
Publication TypeProceedings, refereed
Year of Publication2022
Conference NameSelected Areas in Cryptography (28th International Conference, Virtual Event, September 29 – October 1, 2021, Revised Selected Papers)
PublisherSpringer Nature Switzerland
Place PublishedCham
ISBN Number978-3-030-99276-7
ISSN Number0302-9743

Anonymous communication networks (ACNs) aim to thwart an adversary,
who controls or observes chunks of the communication network,
from determining the respective identities of two communicating parties.
We focus on low-latency ACNs such as Tor, which target a practical level
of anonymity without incurring an unacceptable transmission delay.

While several definitions have been proposed to quantify the level of anonymity
provided by high-latency, message-centric ACNs (such as mix-nets and DC-nets),
this approach is less relevant to Tor, where user--destination pairs communicate
over secure overlay circuits. Moreover, existing evaluation methods of
traffic analysis attacks on Tor appear somewhat ad hoc and fragmented.
We propose a fair evaluation framework for such attacks against onion
routing systems by identifying and discussing the crucial components
for evaluation, including how to consider various adversarial goals,
how to factor in the adversarial ability to collect information relevant
to the attack, and how these components combine to suitable metrics to
quantify the adversary's success.

Citation Key28409

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