Authors | P. Fauzi, M. N. Hovd and H. Raddum |
Editors | T. J. P. C. J.H. |
Title | A Practical Adaptive Key Recovery Attack on the LGM (GSW-like) Cryptosystem |
Afilliation | Cryptography |
Project(s) | Simula UiB |
Status | Published |
Publication Type | Proceedings, refereed |
Year of Publication | 2021 |
Conference Name | International Conference on Post-Quantum Cryptography |
Volume | 12841 |
Pagination | 483-498 |
Date Published | 07/2021 |
Publisher | Springer |
ISBN Number | 978-3-030-81292-8 |
Keywords | GSW, Key recovery, Somewhat homomorphic encryption, Statistical attack |
Abstract | We present an adaptive key recovery attack on the leveled homomorphic encryption scheme suggested by Li, Galbraith and Ma (Provsec 2016), which itself is a modification of the GSW cryptosystem designed to resist key recovery attacks by using a different linear combination of secret keys for each decryption. We were able to efficiently recover the secret key for a realistic choice of parameters using a statistical attack. In particular, this means that the Li, Galbraith and Ma strategy does not prevent adaptive key recovery attacks. |
URL | https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-81293-5_25 |
DOI | 10.1007/978-3-030-81293-5_25 |
Citation Key | 27900 |