Authors | N. Costes and M. Stam |
Title | Redundant Code-based Masking Revisited |
Afilliation | Cryptography |
Project(s) | Cryptography Section |
Status | Published |
Publication Type | Journal Article |
Year of Publication | 2020 |
Journal | IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems |
Volume | 2021 |
Issue | 1 |
Pagination | 426 - 450 |
Date Published | 12/2020 |
Publisher | Ruhr-University of Bochum |
ISSN | 2569-2925 |
Keywords | Coding Theory, Masking, Shamir Secret Sharing, Success Rate |
Abstract | Masking schemes are a popular countermeasure against side-channel attacks. To mask bytes, the two classical options are Boolean masking and polynomial masking. The latter lends itself to redundant masking, where leakage emanates from more shares than are strictly necessary to reconstruct, raising the obvious question how well such “redundant” leakage can be exploited by a side-channel adversary. We revisit the recent work by Chabanne et al. (CHES’18) and show that, contrary to their conclusions, said leakage can—in theory—always be exploited. For the Hamming weight scenario in the low-noise regime, we heuristically determine how security degrades in terms of the number of redundant shares for first and second order secure polynomial masking schemes. |
URL | https://tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/8740 |
DOI | 10.46586/tches.v2021.i1.426-450 |
Citation Key | 27551 |